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Human reliability assessment (HRA) techniques are used for quantifying human error 
probability for the purpose of providing feedback regarding the overall performance, 
and most importantly, safety of the system. Performing HRA involves various 
activities, including task analysis, conducting experiments, which have been found 
generally difficult, time-consuming and costly. In this project, the whole process will 
be based on HRA methodology. For problem identification, a survey and interview are 
conducted. The task analysis of the finding was then constructed and the cause of 
human error is identified using human HAZOP and to be considered in Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) while all the controls will be developed. The Event Tree Analysis then 
developed based on consequences of the human error and all the control will be 
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1.1  Background of Study  
 
By general definition, risk is determined as the likely of losing something of 
value. The ‘value’ mentioned can be categorized as physical health, emotional well-
being, social status, or financial prosperity. In this research context, the risk is 
classified under industrial angle which is operation, production, maintenance and etc.  
One of the field area focused under risk management is the field of human 
factor where behavior and psychology act as a factor in understanding and decision 
making. For example, in road accident, human errors contribute over 70 percent of 
accidents and this percentage value is not far different from industrial accident. 
In overcoming the risk, first, the risk must be assessed. Risk assessment is the 
process where the hazard is recognized, the risks associated with the hazard is studied 
or assessed and the proper way to eliminate or control the hazard is determined. In a 
simpler term, risk assessment is a systematic observation at workplace to identify 
hazards and then decide what measure should be taken to successfully prevent or 
control the harm from occur. 
After assessing the risk, prevention or mitigation measure will be taken into 
account. Mitigation is a process which an organization introduces specific measure to 
minimize or eliminate the unacceptable risk associated within operations to an 
acceptable level or to a more tolerable level. Risk mitigation a step to establish and 
implement an appropriate strategies and effective measure in order to minimize risk 
to a level that is as low as reasonably practical. 
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One of the techniques to assess and mitigate human factor is using Bowtie 
approach. Bowtie is one of many barrier risk models available to support the 
identification and management of risk. It is a visual tool which defines risk providing 
a prospect to recognize and assess the key safety barrier. This method is exclusive in 
its ability to represent complex risk from an understandable viewpoint yet also allow 
detailed risk based on improvement plans. 
 
1.2  Problem Statement 
 
• The approach of Bow Tie does not emphasize on the criticality of the task 
specifically related to human error. 
• Currently known Human Risk Assessment technique does not establish 
preventive and mitigative control simultaneously for human factor aspect 
1.3  Objective  
 
• To develop Bow Tie strategy to assess human error by their critical task 
• To establish preventive and mitigative control in human factor that act 




1.4  Scope of Study 
 
Risk mitigation using Bow Tie strategy can be implemented into many fields 
of industries but for this project, the scope will be narrowed down to process 
industries. All considerations and scenarios that will be used in the development of 
the mitigation process will be based on process industry. To be more specific, this 
project will be conducted and monitored among UTP’s very own community. 
The system that will be tested will be limited since the result will be based on 
the range of availability and adequacy of UTP’s equipment and facilities. The 
participation of students in this project would also affect the result but nevertheless it 
will be sufficient to generate a valid outcome and to prove theories. 
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2.1  Risk Assessment  
 
Risk is a driving consideration in decisions that determine how engineering 
systems are developed, produced, and sustained  (Garvey, 2009). According to (Aven 
& Vinnem, 2010),  risk is the combination of probability and consequences, where the 
consequences relate to various aspects of HSE, for example loss of life and injuries. 
Risks also defined as events that, if the occur, will cause unwanted change in the cost, 
schedule, or technical performance of an engineering system; therefore, the 
occurrence of risk is an event that has negative consequences to an engineering system 
project (Garvey, 2009). 
Risk assessment is the process where the hazard is identified, the risks associated 
with the hazard is analyzed or evaluated and the proper way to eliminate or control the 
hazard is determined. Risk assessment also defined as a formal and systematic analysis 
to identify or qualify frequency or probabilities and magnitude of losses to recipient 
due to exposure of hazard ( physical, chemical or microbial agent) from failures 
involving natural events and failures of hardware, software and human systems 
(Modarres, 2006). Risk assessment not only aim to estimate risk, but also to evaluate 
its significance, so as to consider if the risk is acceptable or not. These considerations 
are the crucial part of the human dimension to risk assessment, in risk assessment there 
is a human dimension in causing accidents and a human dimension in estimating risk 
and evaluating its significance. Thus the acceptance of risk is not straightforward 
(Wong, 2010). According to (Wong, 2010), the five step procedure is suitable to assess 
risk in the work place. The five steps mentioned are: 
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 Identify the hazards; 
 Decide who might be harmed and how; 
 Evaluate the risk and decide on precautions; 
 Records the findings and implement them; and lastly 
 Review the assessment and update as necessary. 
However, the general principle for risk assessment in industry is different where 
the key elements are as follows: 
 Identify hazards, which have a potential of harm; 
 Risk is defined as the probability that a hazardous event could occur; 
 Consequence is the harm resulting from a hazardous event occurring; 
 Risk assessment is the consideration of risk and the consequences of a 
hazardous event in order to decide if any action is necessary to avoid or to 
reduce the risk; and 
 Record the results of the risk assessment and the action taken. 
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2.2  Identification of Hazard 
 
Risk identification is the first step and the most important one is risk 
management process. Garvey stated that risk identification defines the set of future 
event that, if any occur, could have unwanted impact on an engineering system 
project’s cost, schedule, technical performance or any other evaluation criteria defined 
by engineering team. Hazard is a condition or physical situation with a potential for 
an undesirable consequence (loss) (Modarres, 2006). Hazard can be categorized into 
several categories as follows: 
Table 2.1:  Categories of hazard 
Category  Example  
Chemical Toxins, corrosive agents, smoke 
Biological Viruses, microbial agents, 
biocontaminants 
Thermal Explosions, fire 
Mechanical Impact, explosions 
Electrical Electromagnetic fields, electric shock 
Ionizing radiation X-rays, gamma rays 
Nonionizing radiation Microwave radiation, cosmic rays 
Information  Propaganda, computer virus 
 
Each of the hazards will be a part of the system and normal system barrier will 
be used as their containments (e.g., using firewall to prevent unauthorized access of 
information). Provided the system is uninterrupted, the barriers that contain the hazard 
remain unchallenged.  
Risk identification is done to reckon known risks. Risk identification as a 
continuous process which operate regularly throughout the engineering phase and 
evolving system (Garvey, 2009). 
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2.3  Human Factor / Human Reliability 
 
Human factor plays an essential role in determining the magnitude of risk 
possessed in any risk assessment. According to The Reactor Safety Study, more than 
60 percent of the accidents occurred in nuclear industry are related to human error 
(Modarres, 2006) (Wong, 2010). In engineering approaches to risk assessment, it is 
possible to attempt to quantify the contribution made by human action or inaction to 
the overall risk from the system where as the quantification is mainly concerned with 
human action or omission as a direct cause of accidents, not aspect of human failing 
which result in poor design or bad decision (Hurst, 1998).These approaches is known 
as Human Reliability Assessment (HRA), where the process of task analysis which 
helps with the identification of all points in a sequence of operation at which incorrect 
human action or the failure to act may lead to adverse consequences for plant and/or 
for people is included. According to (Modarres, 2006), there are limitations and 
difficulties in current HRA which are: 
a) Human behavior is complex subject that cannot be described as a simple 
hardware in a system. Human performance can be affected by social, 
environmental, psychological, and physical factors that are difficult to 
quantify. 
b) Human action cannot be considered to have binary success and failure states, 
as in hardware failure. Moreover, the full range of human interaction has not 
been fully analyzed by HRA method. 
c) The most difficult part of HRA is the lack of appropriate data on human 
behavior in extreme situations. 
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2.4  Risk Handling 
 
There are plenty of ways to handle risks. In general, there are several categories 
that the risk handling strategies can be divided, such as Risk Avoidance, Risk Control, 
Risk Acceptance, or Risk Transfer. 
2.4.1  Risk Avoidance 
 
This risk strategy involves a change in the concept, requirements, specifications, 
and/or practices that reduce risk to an acceptable level. A risk avoidance strategy 
eliminates the source of high or possibly medium risks and replaces them with a lower 
risk solution. Solution like stated before should be supported by a corresponding cost-
benefit analysis. Normally, this strategy may be conducted in parallel with up-front 
capability planning or requirements analyses and supported by cost tradeoff studies 
(Bahnmaier, 2003). 
2.4.2  Risk Control 
 
Risk control actively engages strategies to reduce or mitigate risk. It monitors and 
manages risk in a manner that reduces its occurrence probability and/or consequences 
on the project. Risk control is a widely exercised handling strategy by a project’s 
management. Because of this, various approaches to monitoring the progress of 
mitigation strategies have been developed (Bahnmaier, 2003) (Garvey, 2001) 
(Garvey, 2005). 
2.4.3  Risk Acceptance 
 
Risk acceptance is an acknowledgement of the existence of a particular risk 
situation and a conscious decision to accept the associated level of risk without 
engaging in special efforts to control it. However, a general cost and schedule reserve 
may be set aside to deal with any problem that may occur as a result of various risk 
acceptance decision. This strategy recognizes that not all identified program risk 
warrant special handling; as such, it is most suited for those situations that have been 
classified as low risk (Garvey, 2001). 
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2.4.4  Risk Transfer 
 
This strategy is one that relocates risk from one part of the projects to another or 
redistributing risks between the organization acquiring the system and the system’s 
prime contractor. Risk transfer is a form of risk sharing. It should not be viewed as 
risk abrogation. An example is the transfer of a function from hardware 
implementation to software implementation. The effectiveness of risk transfer 
depends on the use of successful system engineering techniques, such as modular 




2.5  Bow Tie 
 
The Bow-Tie is a model that represents how a hazard can be released, escalate, 
and how it is controlled. It contains the elements required to successfully manage the 
hazard such that the risks are tolerable and ALARP.  Bow-Ties can also be used to 
support risk management of non-HSE processes. 
For each severity or high level hazard, the Bow-Tie methodology allows for: 
1. Identification of the hazard release, escalation and consequence scenarios 
2. Identification of controls, e.g. barriers and escalation factor controls 
required to manage the hazards 
3. Categorization of controls into Inherent Safety, Safety Critical Element 
(hardware) or Critical activity (procedures, processes, operator action) 
4. A clear visual representation to enable the ALARP review to be undertaken 
5. An aid in the incident review process if occurrence of such a major incident 
has occurred.  

















Illustrating not only what controls are 
currently in place today, but, through 
the use of critical tasks, why they will 
still be there tomorrow.  
Not limited to assessment of HSE 
risks (management of security, 
information technology, business 
interruption and project risks) Focusing on risk management by 
people on a day-to-day basis, rather 
than analytical studies by technical 
risk specialists.  
Can focus on what people are actually 
doing rather than the condition of 
physical systems.  
Considering all aspects of the 
management of risk, from initial 
cause to final consequence in a 
sequential manner.  
Figure 2.2: Benefit of Bow Tie 
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3.1  Research Methodology 
 




Identification of Equipment 
Identification of Critical Tasks related 
with selected Equipment 
Identification of Human error related 
with tasks 
Development of Proactive Controls 
Identification of Consequences related 
to Human Error 
Development of reactive controls 






Figure 3.1:  Bow-Tie construction framework 
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3.1.1  Identification of Error-Inducing Equipment  
 
In this study, a survey will be conducted for students and staffs to identify the flaw 
in risk control in several category of the system. The equipment will be specified based 
on what the student is working on. The categories and their attributes that will be 
studied are;  
Table 3.1:  Attributes of categories used in survey form 
Categories Attributes  Remark  
Facilities and Equipment Condition  Overall condition of facilities and 
equipment in the laboratory 
Usefulness  
Adequacy  Adequacy of equipment and 
facilities against the number of 
student in need 
Training provided  Instruction 
clarity 
Before, during and after operation. 
Impact Competency and safety level 
Adequacy Adequacy of trainings given with 
all equipment to be operated 
Implementation of PPE Inspection 
frequency 
How frequent does person in charge 
inspect the implementation of PPE 
during experiment? 
Emphasis  How serious is the use of PPE to be 
emphasized 
Adequacy  Adequacy of  numbers of PPE 
provided with the number of person 
during any operation in laboratory 
Signs and Labels Clarity  Easy to observe and listen 
Understanding  Based on provided sign and labels, 




Clarity  How clear the procedure provided 
Understanding  Based on instruction in SOP, how 
well the understanding about the 
instruction? 
Emphasis How well is the emphasis of SOP 
before, during and after performing 
an experiment? 
 
A survey form will be distributed and the scores for every attributes in the 
categories will be tabulated and studied. Sample of survey form is attached in 
APPENDIX.  
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3.1.2  Representation of Tasks  
 
Based on the previous finding, the equipment that identified with most possible 
human error will be studied to extract a proper and complete step-by-step sequence to 
develop Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA). From the HTA developed, all possible 
causes that can lead to human error can be identified. 
 
 
3.1.3  Identification of Critical Tasks  
 
Based on Hierarchical Task Analysis, the task required to operate the equipment 
already listed down. The tasks cover equipment start up, maintenance, commissioning, 
shut down, etc. The list of steps to operate the equipment then will be undergoing a 
screening by Human HAZOP to determine the criticality of the task according to the 
risk matrix. 
Table 3.2:  Guide Word for Human HAZOP 
Guide word Interpretation  
No  Task not done/complete 
Less  Task done less than required action 
More Task done more than required action 
Reverse Task done opposite of required action 
Part of Task partially done (step omitted) 
As well as Additional task added to original task 
Other than Task done differently 
Sooner Task done before time specified 
Main objective 
Task 1 Task 4 Task 3 Task 2 
Subtask 2.3 Subtask 2.2 Subtask 2.1 
Figure 3.2:  HTA concept 
15 
Later Task done after time specified 
Other  Different factor that may be influence actions 
 
Table 3.3:  Risk Matrix 
 Catastrophic (1) 
 
Critical (2) Marginal (3) 
Frequent (A) High High Medium 
Probable (B) High High Medium 
Occasional (C) High  Medium Low 
Remote (D) Medium Medium  Low  
Improbable (E) Medium  Low  Low  
Source: Mil STD 882-E 
From the risk matrix above, the criticality of the task for this project is focused 
on the higher ranking. As referred to the table below, the task criticality will be 
classified in the risk ranking column where the probability and severity of each task 
will determine the ranking of risk for every task performed. 









1        






3.1.4  Development of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
From Human HAZOP, the list of causes of human error will be used to develop 
FTA. To prevent and counter the causes from becoming the real risk, all possible 
control measure is identified. In this step, causes of the top event which is the human 
error will be studied carefully to completely identify all control that can be used to 




3.1.5  Development of Event Tree (ETA) 
 
In this step, all possible consequences associated with human error will be 
identified first. And then the countermeasure and control is determined to mitigate and 
prevent the worst case scenarios from the consequence lists. The control to overcome 
the consequences may have one or more layers. 




3.1.6  Development of Bow Tie  
 
Since bow tie is basically the combination of fault tree and event tree, the data 
collected in previous step will be gathered and combined. Adjustment will be made 
where and when required. 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  Event Tree Analysis 
Figure 3.5:  Bow Tie Model 
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S Literature Review & Methodology
Survey - To Determine Suitability Of Equipment
Process - Human HAZOP, Fault Tree analysis, Event Tree 
Analysis, Bow Tie
Report Preparation
Report Submission & Oral Presentation
Figure 3.6:  Project Activities 
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3.3  Gantt Chart & Key Milestone 
Table 3.5:  Gant Chart & key milestone for FYP1 & FYP 2 
No  Detail Work (FYP1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Selection of Project Topic               
2 Preliminary Research Work               
3 Submission of Extended Proposal               
4 Proposal Defense               
5 Project Work Continues               
6 Submission of Interim Draft Report               




No  Detail Work (FYP2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Project Work Continues                
2 Submission of Progress Report                
3 Project Work Continues                
4 Pre-SEDEX                
5 Submission of Draft Final Report                
6 Submission of Dissertation (soft bound)                
7 Submission of Technical Paper                
8 Viva                
9 Submission of Project Dissertation (Hard Bound)                
 
 Process  
 Milestone  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
4.1  Identification of Error Inducing Equipment 
 
The identification of error inducing equipment is determined by a run of survey 
among UTP student who using laboratory equipment for their experiments. This step 
is performed to determine the equipment that possesses high potential of human error 
in 5 aspects which are condition of equipment, trainings provided, personal protective 
equipment, sign and labels, and standard operating procedures. 
The table below shows the average score of each attribution for every aspect 
to be considered in selection of equipment as responded by every respondent in the 
survey.  
Table 4.1:  Average score for Equipment and Facilities category 
Equipment and 
facilities 
Condition Usefulness Adequacy  
Average 
score 
Furnace  4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Oven 4.7 5.0 4.0 4.6 
Centrifuge 3.0 5.0 2.0 3.3 
UV-Vis 4.0 5.0 4.0 4.3 
Spray Dryer 4.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 
SEM 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
HPLC 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.33 
Magnetic 
Heater 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Solubility 
Testing 
3.0 3.0 2.0 2.7 
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As shown to the table below, all average scores for all categories are tabulated. 
The scores then used to determine the equipment which possesses high risk of human 
error. 
















Furnace  4.5 4.2 4.5 3.2 4.0 
Oven 4.6 3.8 4.1 3.4 3.9 
Centrifuge 3.3 3.7 4.3 3.0 4.0 
UV-Vis 4.3 4.0 2.7 5.0 4.0 
Spray 
Dryer 
3.0 3.3 3.0 4.0 2.0 
SEM 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.0 3.0 
HPLC 4.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Magnetic 
Heater 
4.0 4.0 3.3 3.0 2.7 
Solubility 
Testing 
2.7 4.0 4.0 3.7 2.0 
 
By summing up all the average scores based on the individual attributes for 
each equipment, equipment with the most error inducing condition can be determined. 
Table below shows the total score for each equipment: 
  
23 
Table 4.3:  Determination Score for Error Inducing Equipment 





Spray Dryer 15.3 
SEM 17.7 
HPLC 16.3 
Magnetic Heater 17.0 
Solubility Testing 16.4 
 
From table above, it is observable that the score for spray dryer is the lowest 
among the other equipment. So, spray dryer will be selected as the error inducing 
equipment for further assessment. 
4.2  Representation of Tasks  
 
The representation of human error related task in operation of spray dryer is using 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA). Before the identification of any causes and 
consequences for every human error related to this equipment, first, the steps to operate 
the equipment should be known. Listed below are the operation steps for spray dryer:  
1. Mix feed solution in tank(s) located behind the spray dryer.  
1.1. Verify that the feed tank valves remain closed until you are ready to run. 
2. Set (open) valves on feed tanks to feed stock solution to pump as desired. 
3. Open pump petcock valve  
3.1. Until feed stock flows out of valve 
3.2. Close the valve. 
4. If feedstock does not flow out of the pump valve, contact the lab manager. 
5. Open the main gas pipe valve ½ turn so that the valve headpiece is in line with the 
pipe. The valve is located on the rear of the spray dryer. 
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From the operation steps listed, the tasks and the subtasks involved then will 
be listed and transferred into HTA diagram.  
 
 
4.3  Identification of Critical Tasks  
 
To determine the criticality of the listed task, the list then will be undergoing a 
screening process by Human HAZOP. Human HAZOP will determine whether the 
task classified as high, medium or low risk based on the risk ranking. Determination 
of ranking for each task criticality is based on the probability of the incident happened 
against the severity of the accident. The table below shows how some the risk of the 



























Figure 4.1:  Developed HTA model 
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Table 4.4:  Human HAZOP Worksheet 
Intention: Set (open) valves on feed tanks to feed stock solution to pump as desired. 
No. Guide 
Word 
Deviation Cause Risk 
ranking 
Consequence Safe guard Action 




 Operator does 




 Operator might 












































condition of valve 
C2 Refer to 
valve not 
closed 






4.4  Development of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
After conducting Human HAZOP, the causes that lead to the main event are 
identified. The safeguards that have been developed to prevent the cause from 
occurring are also listed. The FTA concept that will be applied is slightly different 
from the generic method. In this case study, the probability calculation is omitted. 
Instead, the safeguards are added with respect to the causes to make it parallel with the 
qualitative assessment. The FTA below shows the causes that may lead the operator to 
run the pump without having the feed. The OR gate is use, to show that any of the 
















The table below shows the simplification of code for safeguard to be applied 
in the fault tree. 
Table 4.5:  Safeguard for FTA Model 
Code Safeguard 
SG 1 Provide proper training for operator 
SG 2 Establish merit system 
SG 3 Require presence of supervisor 
SG 4 Reposition signs 














might not see 






















The preventive measure (safeguard) will be applied to the causes in order to 
eliminate or at least reduce the possibility for the top event to occur. Every control may 
or may not eliminate the threat successfully. Sometimes more than one layer of control 
is required in order to minimize the threat as possible. 
4.5  Development of Event Tree 
 
Developing Event Tree for this case study is to represent the mitigative control 
for every consequence as listed in the Human HAZOP. The concepts applied are 
similar to the generic ETA methodology but the applications are different. The 
intermediate events which to determine the consequences from the initiating event are 
replaced with mitigative control which will confirm the occurrence of the 









might not see 


























Without any control to the initiating event (Operator run pump without feed), 
the operator might experience hearing loss and the equipment (pump) will damage. 
The mitigative control is applied to the possibility of occurrence to minimize and 
eliminate the risk of injury and mechanical damage. The control may be applied in 




pump without feed 
Operator safe, pump 
not damaged 
Operator safe but pump 
may damaged 
Loud sound of pump 
cavitation may impair 
operator’s hearing 
Operator wear ear protection 
No  
Yes 
Operator lower pump RPM 
No  
Yes 
Figure 4.4:  Developed ETA Model  
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4.6  Integration of FTA and ETA into Bow Tie  
 
After the development of FTA and ETA is done, the Bow Tie model will be developed by integrating both of the Tree analysis. The model 
might be a little different than the generic Bow Tie model as developed from the software but the components are provided are similar. Figure 











Operator run pump 
without feed 
Operator safe, pump not 
damaged 
Operator safe but pump 
may damaged 
Loud sound of pump 
cavitation may impair 
operator’s hearing 
Operator wear ear protection 
No  
Yes 





 Operator might 
not see the signs 
































Figure 4.5: Developed Bow Tie Model  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This project is conducted because the existing Human Reliability Assessment 
(HRA) techniques existed was ill defined in the aspect to mitigate the human risk 
where the tools used to control and mitigate risk was not specifically aim for human 
error. The existing technique mostly is not appropriate for realistic analysis and the 
error diagnosis is insufficient. The aim for this project is to develop a model for safety 
critical task analysis into sequence of control and consequences and also to integrate 
said sequence into Bow-tie working system where then can be embedded into daily 
industrial operations. 
This project is focused only within UTP’s community. Perhaps for further 
study or for broader sample set, it is recommended to conduct the information 
gathering at a much bigger location such as industry itself. The qualitative and 
quantitative analysis for this project can be improved and enhance a little bit more if 
all the assumption, and consideration to be taken deeper. 
This approach is important as it deals with human lives. The mitigation of 
human risk by Bow Tie model is believed can be used to reduce the potential accident 
caused by human error by a significant percentage. By implementing these systems, 
major accidents can be avoided and fatality can be reduced. 
The execution of this project is within capability of a final year student with 
the help and guidance from the supervisor, co-supervisor and the coordinator. The time 
frame is also feasible and the project can be completed within the time allocated. It is 
hoped that the acquiring of equipment and materials needed for the experiment runs 
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Condition Usefulness Adequacy Average score 
Furnace 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 
Oven 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.8 
Centrifuge 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.7 
UV-Vis 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 
Rotary 
Evaporator 
3.0 4.0 3.0 3.3 
SEM 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
HPLC 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Magnetic Heater 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Solubility 
Testing 






Emphasis  Adequacy Average score 
Furnace 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Oven 4.3 4.3 3.7 4.1 
Centrifuge 5.0 5.0 3.0 4.3 
UV-Vis 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.7 
Rotary 
Evaporator 
4.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 
SEM 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 
HPLC 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Magnetic Heater 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.3 
Solubility 
Testing 












Emphasis  Adequacy Average score 
Furnace 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.2 
Oven 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.4 
Centrifuge 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
UV-Vis 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Rotary 
Evaporator 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
SEM 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
HPLC 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Magnetic Heater 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Solubility 
Testing 






Emphasis  Adequacy Average score 
Furnace 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Oven 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.9 
Centrifuge 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
UV-Vis 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Rotary 
Evaporator 
1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 
SEM 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
HPLC 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Magnetic Heater 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 
Solubility 
Testing 




Intention: Verify that the feed tank valves remain closed until you are ready to run. 
No. Guide 
Word 






















































Answer instruction: 1. Fill in the blank with the 
equipment operated 
2. Rate question in box by rating 
from 1-5 (very bad- very good) 
 
Equipment used: ___________________________ 
Facilities & Equipment 
Condition   
Usefulness  
Adequacy   
 
Training 







Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
 Inspection frequency  
Emphasis   
Adequacy   
 
Signs & Labels 
Clarity   
Understanding   
Emphasis  
 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
Clarity   
Understanding   
Emphasis  
 
 
